Abstract. Despite the large number of certificateless encryption schemes recently proposed, many of them have been found to be insecure under a practical attack called malicious-but-passive KGC attack, since they all follow the same key generation procedure as that of the one proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in ASIACRYPT 2003. The only provably secure certificateless encryption scheme against this attack is due to Libert and Quisquater (PKC 2006). However, the security can only be shown in the random oracle model. In this paper, we first show that a scheme which has a different key generation procedure from that of Al-Riyami and Paterson also suffers from the malicious-but-passive KGC attack. Our attacking techniques are different from the previous attacks and may cause greater extent of damage than the previous ones. We also propose a generic construction of certificateless encryption which can be proven secure against this attack in the standard model. This generic scheme is not only the first one proven secure in the standard model, but is also very efficient to instantiate. We also describe how to use short signature and hybrid encryption to construct highly efficient instantiations of this generic scheme.
Introduction
In traditional public key cryptography, a user selects a public/private key pair (pk, sk) and publishes pk. A certificate, which essentially is a signature on the user's identity and pk issued by a certification authority (CA), will then be employed for indicating the relationship between the user and pk. This method works under the public key infrastructure (PKI) involves a lot of additional work for managing the certificates that include revocation, storage and distribution.
In 1984, Shamir [12] , introduced the notion of identity-based cryptography, aiming to alleviate the existing problems in PKI by getting rid of certificates. A user can use an email address, an IP address or any other information related to his identity, that is publicly known and unique in the whole system, as his public key. There is a trusted party, called Key Generation Center (KGC), which is in charge of the user private key generation. The advantage of an identity-based cryptosystem is that anyone can simply use the user's identity to encrypt messages. This can be done even before the user gets its private key from the KGC. However, the user must also completely trust the KGC, which can impersonate the user and decrypt any of the user's ciphertexts. This issue is generally referred to as key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] introduced certificateless cryptography, which is intended to solve the key escrow problem that is inherent in identity-based cryptography, while at the same time, eliminate the use of certificates as in the traditional PKI. In a certificateless cryptosystem, the KGC is involved to issue a user partial key psk ID for a user with identity ID. The user independently generates a user public/private key pair (upk ID , usk ID ), and publishes upk ID . A message will then encrypted under both upk ID and the user's identity ID. To decrypt a ciphertext, sidered as a sequential encryption as in [17, 2] , with an additional signature-based mechanism to defend against attacks discussed in [10] , but without relying on the assumption of random oracles. The construction is also efficient. We will describe how to use short signature [4] and hybrid encryption to implement highly efficient instantiations of this generic scheme.
We show that a recently proposed certificateless encryption scheme [11] also suffers from the malicious-but-passive KGC attack. As mentioned above, schemes in [1, 7, 9] are vulnerable to the malicious-but-passive KGC attack described in [2] as they all follow the same key generation procedure as that of [1] . However, the attacking technique of [2] does not apply to the scheme in [11] as the key generation procedure is different. We propose two malicious-but-passive KGC attacks against the scheme in [11] . The first attack causes the same extent of damage as the attack described in [2] against [1, 7, 9] . The second attack may cause greater impact to the system as the KGC is able to decrypt ciphertexts which are for any user in the system without preselecting a target user. Note that our attacks do not refute the security claims made in [11] , since the KGC in their security model launches attacks only after honestly generating the master public/private key pair (and system parameters).
Paper Organization. In Sec. 2, we define the certificateless encryption scheme and its security. In Sec. 3, we show that the certificateless encryption scheme in [11] is vulnerable to some new malicious-but-passive KGC attacks. Our generic construction of secure encryption schemes and its security analysis are provided in Sec. 4. We also describe some instantiations of the generic scheme based on short signature and hybrid encryption. The paper is concluded in Sec. 5.
Definition and Adversarial Model
A certificateless encryption scheme [1, 2] consists of five (probabilistic) polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms:
-MasterKeyGen: On input 1 k where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it generates a master public/private key pair (mpk, msk). -PartialKeyGen: On input msk and a user identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , it generates a user partial key psk ID . -UserKeyGen: On input mpk and a user identity ID, it generates a user public/private key pair (upk ID , usk ID ). -Enc: On input mpk, a user identity ID, a user public key upk ID and a message m, it returns a ciphertext c. -Dec: On input a user private key usk ID , a user partial key psk ID , and a ciphertext c, it returns the plaintext m.
In practice, the KGC (Key Generation Center) performs the first two algorithms: MasterKeyGen and PartialKeyGen. The master public key mpk is then published and it is assumed that everyone in the system can get a legitimate copy of mpk. It is also assumed that the partial key is issued to the corresponding user via a secure channel so that no one except the intended user can get it. Every user in the system also performs UserKeyGen for generating its own public/private key pair and publishes the public key. The correctness requirement is defined in the conventional way. We skip the details and refer readers to [1, 2] for details.
Adversarial Model. There are two types of security for a certificateless encryption scheme, Type-I security and Type-II security, along with two types of adversaries, A 1 and A 2 , respectively. Adversary A 1 models a malicious adversary which compromises the user private key usk ID or replaces the user public key upk ID , however, cannot compromise the master private key msk nor get access to the user partial key psk ID . Adversary A 2 models the malicious-but-passive KGC which controls the generation of the master public/private key pair, and that of any user partial key psk ID . The following are five oracles which can be accessed by the adversaries. Remark : In the original adversarial model of certificateless encryption [1, 10] , it is required that the Decryption oracle should provide correct decryptions even after the user public key has been replaced by the adversary while the corresponding user secret key is not known. We believe that the model is hardly realistic. Hence in this paper, we only require the Decryption oracle to perform the decryption task by using the current user keys. This also captures the case that the user public key is replaced by the adversary, but the user secret key remains the same. It is possible that the message m recovered from the ciphertext by using the current usk ID is ⊥.
Game-I : Let C 1 be the challenger/simulator and k ∈ N be a security parameter. Game-II : Let C 2 be the simulator/challenger and k ∈ N be a security parameter.
1. C 2 runs A 2 on input 1 k , which returns a master public key mpk to C 2 . Note that A 2 cannot make any oracle query at this stage 2 . 2. A 2 can start querying oracles CreateUser, RevealSecretKey, ReplaceKey and Decryption.
Note that oracle RevealPartialKey is no longer needed as A 2 knows the master private key msk, and A 2 may not follow the specification of MasterKeyGen to generate (msk, mpk). One thing to notice is that when A 2 issues a query to CreateUser oracle, it has to additionally provide the user partial key psk ID . 3. A 2 submits two equal-length messages (m 0 , m 1 ) along with a target identity ID * . C 2 randomly selects a bit b, and computes the challenge ciphertext c * by running c * ← Enc(mpk, ID * , upk ID * , m b ). It returns c * to A 2 . 4. A 2 continues to issue queries as in step 2. Finally, it outputs a bit b .
A 2 is said to win the game if b = b, and (1)
. Similarly, we denote by P r[A 2 Succ] the probability that A 2 wins the game, and define the advantage of A 2 in Game-II to be Adv
Definition 1. A certificateless encryption scheme CLE is said to be Type-I secure (resp. Type-II secure) if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A 1 (resp. A 2 ) which wins Game-I (resp. Game-II) with non-negligible advantage. CLE is said to be IND-CCA2 secure if it is both Type-I secure and Type-II secure.
Malicious-but-Passive KGC Attack
We describe two new malicious-but-passive KGC attacking techniques (under Game-II) to compromise schemes that follow the key generation procedure described in [11] . The techniques are different from that in [2] , which is used to compromise schemes based on another type of key generation procedures [1, 7, 9] .
We briefly describe the certificateless encryption scheme proposed in [11] to a certain extent that our attacking technique can be understood without referring to the complete description of the original scheme. In the MasterKeyGen of [11] , the KGC first generates a pairing e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 such that each group has order p. Then, a generator g of G 1 is selected. This is followed by the selection of a set of random elements in G 1 . The parameters we are going to use in the attack below are g 2 , g 1 , h 1 , u ∈ R G 1 andÛ = {û i } whereû i ∈ R G 1 , for i = 1, · · · , n, and some n ∈ Z. We skip the description of the remaining steps of MasterKeyGen and also the entire PartialKeyGen. In UserKeyGen, the user public key upk ID * for a user with identity ID * is denoted by (pk (1) , pk (2) ) ∈ G 2 1 . We do not need to look into how these two elements are generated. Our first attack is described as follows.
(Attack 1) The malicious-but-passive KGC (that is A 2 in Game-II) arbitrarily selects a target identity ID * . It computes u = H u (ID * ), where H u : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a collision-resistant hash function pre-defined for this scheme. Let u[i] be the i-th bit of u. Define U ⊆ {1, · · · , n} to be the set of indices such that u[i] = 1. The KGC then randomly selects s ∈ R Z p , and sets g 2 = (U * ) s , where U * = u i∈Uû i . Other parameters in the master public/private key pair are generated normally by the KGC. In the challenge phase of Game-II, the KGC submits two distinct equal-length messages, (m 0 , m 1 ), and ID * as the target identity. The challenger C 2 randomly selects a bit b, computes the challenge ciphertext C * = (Ĉ * , com * , tag * ) according to the encryption algorithm of [11] . Let the challenge ciphertextĈ * = (C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 , C * 4 ). According to the specification of the encryption algorithm in [11] , we have
where t ∈ R Z p and M = m b dec for some binary string dec. The KGC can get the plaintext of C * by computing the following
By comparing m b with m 0 and m 1 , the KGC can easily find out the message corresponding to C * . This attack causes the same extent of damage as that described in [2] against [1, 7, 9] . Both attacks require the KGC to pre-select a target identity. The KGC is not able to compromise two users in the system under the Game-II. Specific to this certificateless encryption scheme described in [11] , there is a more powerful malicious-but-passive KGC attacking technique which allows the KGC to decrypt any ciphertext in the system regardless which user is the corresponding decryptor. Therefore, the KGC does not need to pre-select a target identity.
(Attack 2) Note that the message M is 'masked' in C * 1 by e(pk (2) , g 2 ) t . Instead of selecting g 2 randomly from G 1 , suppose the malicious-but-passive KGC randomly picks β ∈ Z p and sets g 2 = g β . We can see that the KGC can remove the mask of any ciphertext by simply computing the mask value as e(pk (2) , C * 2 ) β . As a further remark, the certificateless signature scheme described in [11] also suffers from a malicious-but-passive KGC attacking technique which is very similar to the first one described above. Precisely, the KGC can forge any signature of a pre-selected target identity ID * , as it shares the same key generation procedure. We skip the details here and emphasize that the attacks above do not refute the security claims made in [11] as their security model does not consider/capture the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks.
A Design Philosophy: To design a certificateless scheme, no matter it is an encryption scheme or a signature scheme, for security against malicious-but-passive KGC attacks, we have a great concern on its security if the scheme requires the user to make use of the parameters generated by the KGC when generating its own user public/private key pair (via UserKeyGen). The attacks above illustrate how subtle an attack can be if the malicious-but-passive KGC has certain control on the parameters used for user key pair generation. In the first attack above, the KGC can simply modify the generation of g 2 which is one of the many parameters generated/controlled by the KGC. The user has no way to tell if g 2 is generated accordingly or maliciously. In fact, there are many other ways for the KGC to break the scheme in [11] , as there are many parameters generated by or under control of the KGC. One can easily come up with more attacks against the one in [11] in addition to the two attacks described above. In addition, even if the KGC only generates a set of group parameters, for example, a bilinear pairing operation and its associated groups, we cannot guarantee that any malicious-but-passive KGC attack cannot be launched. The reason is that the groups generated and the bilinear operation chosen by the malicious KGC may not be 'generic' [13] . There may exist some trapdoor such that only the one who generates the group parameters, in our case, it is the malicious KGC, can perform some operations efficiently. Therefore, those schemes which require the user to use group parameters generated by the KGC may either be broken by some newly discovered malicious-but-passive KGC attacking techniques, or have their security left unproven.
In our generic scheme proposed below, we design our scheme such that the user partial key and user secret key are generated and used totally independently, while retaining high efficiency.
Our Scheme
In this section, we propose a generic certificateless encryption scheme CLE and show that it is secure under the adversarial model defined in Sec. 2. In particular, this generic scheme is the first one proven secure against the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks in the standard model.
Let IBE = (KG, Extract, Enc, Dec) be an IND-ID-CCA2 secure identity-based encryption scheme, PKE = (KG, Enc, Dec) an IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme, and S = (KG, Sign, Vrfy) a strong one-time signature scheme. For formal definitions of IBE, PKE and S, please refer to Appendix A. In the following, we propose a generic certificateless encryption scheme CLE, which is based on these three primitives.
-MasterKeyGen: The KGC runs (mpk, msk) ← IBE.KG(1 k ), publishes mpk and keeps msk secret. -PartialKeyGen: On input an identity ID, the KGC runs psk ID ← IBE.Extract(msk, ID) and returns psk ID . -UserKeyGen: The user (with identity ID) runs (upk ID , usk ID ) ← PKE.KG(1 k ), publishes (ID, upk ID ) and stores usk ID . -Enc: To encrypt a message m for user ID, the encryptor computes the following and returns c:
-Dec: On input an identity ID and a ciphertext c = (c 2 , σ, vk), if 0 ← S.Vrfy(vk, σ, c 2 ), ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, the decryptor computes the following:
If vk = vk, the decryptor outputs ⊥; otherwise, it outputs m. Theorem 1. The certificateless encryption scheme CLE is Type-I secure, provided that the underlying identity-based encryption scheme IBE is IND-ID-CCA2 secure, and the one-time signature scheme S is strongly unforgeable.
Proof. Suppose that A 1 is a PPT adversary that tries to break the Type-I security of CLE. Let the challenge ciphertext that A 1 receives be c * = (c * 2 , σ * , vk * ). We say a ciphertext c = (c 2 , σ, vk) is valid with respect to identity ID if the decryption oracle would not output ⊥ on input (ID, c). We denote by Forge 1 the event that vk * appears in a decryption query (ID, c = (c 2 , σ, vk * )) issued by A 1 such that c is valid with respect to ID and (c 2 , σ) = (c * 2 , σ * ). Then we have: Lemma 1. P r[Forge 1 ] is negligible in the security parameter k.
Please refer to Appendix B for the proofs. Therefore, by these two lemmas, we have
hich is also negligible in k. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. The certificateless encryption scheme CLE is Type-II secure if the underlying public key encryption scheme PKE is IND-CCA2 secure and the one-time signature scheme S is strongly unforgeable.
Proof. Suppose that A 2 is a PPT adversary that tries to break the Type-II security of CLE. Let c * = (c * 2 , σ * , vk * ) be the challenge ciphertext that A 2 receives, and let Forge 2 be the event that vk * appears in a decryption query (ID, c = (c 2 , σ, vk)) issued by A 2 (i.e., vk * = vk) such that c is valid with respect to ID and (c 2 , σ) = (c * 2 , σ * ). We have the following two lemmas:
This proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and is omitted here. Proof. We construct a PPT algorithm C 2 to break the IND-CCA2 security of PKE by using A 2 as a subroutine. Given the challenge public key pk and a decryption oracleŌ D , C 2 runs A 2 on input 1 k , which returns a master public key mpk. Assume that A 2 issues at most q distinct CreateUser queries. Then, C 2 randomly selects i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q}, runs (vk * , sk * ) ← S.KG(1 k ), stores (vk * , sk * ) which will be used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext of A 2 , and simulates all the oracles for A 2 as follows: Obviously, the probability that C 2 doesn't abort in simulating ReplaceKey and RevealSecretKey oracles is at least 1/q. If C 2 doesn't abort in simulating the two oracles, the probability that it wins its own game is . Thus, we get that the advantage that C 2 wins its game is
Guaranteed by the IND-CCA2 security of PKE, we have that Adv C 2 is negligible in k. Thus,
2 is negligible as well since 1/q is polynomial in k. By the two lemmas above, we have
hich is negligible as well. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
The following corollary is obtained immediately from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. The certificateless encryption scheme CLE described above is IND-CCA2 secure.
Discussion
In practice, for high performance in the encryption process, we usually use the hybrid encryption method which combines a public key encryption and a symmetric encryption to encrypt the message instead of using the public key encryption directly to encrypt bulk data. To apply this to our generic scheme CLE, we first generate a random symmetric key key for a secure symmetric encryption scheme SE, then use SE to encrypt m vk under key, and finally encrypt key using CLE. The decryption algorithm is modified accordingly. One of the key advantages of applying the hybrid encryption onto CLE (besides efficiency) is that the message space will not be restricted by the size of the verification key vk. We elaborate more on the size of vk below. The (strong) one-time signature in our generic scheme CLE provides a certain assurance on that the encryptor did encrypt the message itself (or the 'well-formedness' of a ciphertext). Since most of the one-time signature schemes in the literature follow the 'one-way function' paradigm [5] , the verification key and the signature are both of large size. An immediate consequence is that the message encrypted (i.e., m vk) and the resulting ciphertext (i.e., c = (c 2 , σ, vk)) of our scheme also suffer from the large size. We describe two methods which can significantly reduce the size in the actual implementation of CLE.
One simple solution is to replace the strong one-time signature scheme with a conventional signature scheme which is strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack. This does not weaken the security of CLE because any strongly unforgeable signature scheme is also a strong one-time signature scheme. A good candidate is the short signature proposed by Boneh and Boyen [4] as the verification key and the signature of the scheme in [4] are both small in size. The tradeoff is that the resulting scheme requires more computation than that of a strong one-time signature scheme.
Another solution is to first map the one-time verification key into a much shorter string using a target collision-resistant hash function H 3 , and then encrypt m H(vk) rather than m vk. The decryption algorithm is changed accordingly. That is, the user checks if the second part of the plaintext (decrypted from the ciphertext) is the hash of vk. To analyze the security of this modified scheme, we need to show that it is negligible for the adversary to issue a Decryption query on input ID and c = (c 2 , σ, vk) such that vk = vk * but H(vk) = H(vk * ), where vk * is the verification key in the challenge ciphertext. It is guaranteed by the collision-resistance property of H. This method reduces the impact on the message size by the size of the verification key while adding only slightly on the computation cost. However, the ciphertext is not much shorter than that of the original scheme.
Yet, we observe that the verification key vk could be removed from the ciphertext without any influence on the security of the resulting encryption scheme. In this way, there is no need to use the asymmetric version of one-time signature. Instead, we could use a (strong) one-time message authentication code (MAC) [14, 15, 3, 8] . The new scheme CLE enjoys better efficiency and much shorter ciphertext than CLE. The definition of strong one-time MAC and the new construction will be described in the next part.
A More Efficient Scheme
A message authentication code MAC is a pair of polynomial-time algorithms (Mac, Vrfy) such that:
-Mac takes as input a key mk ∈ K M (the key space of MAC) and a message m, and outputs a tag σ, where k is the security parameter and m is in some implicit message space. We denote this by σ ← Mac mk (m). Without loss of generality, we can also simply assume here that the key space K M of MAC is {0, 1} k . -Vrfy takes as input a key mk, a message m and a tag σ and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
where the 1-value of b indicates 'accept' and 0-value indicates 'reject'. We denote this by b ← Vrfy mk (m, σ).
For the security of a message authentication code, we consider the following game:
1. A random key mk ∈ {0, 1} k is chosen; 2. A M (1 k ) is allowed to submit a message m and is then returned σ ← Mac mk (m).
3. Finally, A M outputs (m * , σ * ).
We say that A M wins if 1 ← Vrfy mk (m * , σ * ) and (m * , σ * ) = (m, σ) (assuming that A M did issue a query for a tag on input m in step 2).
Definition 2.
A message authentication code MAC is said to be strong one-time secure, if for any PPT adversary A M , the probability that A M wins the the above game is negligible in k.
Now we begin to describe the more efficient scheme. Let IBE and PKE be as in Sec. 4, and let MAC = (Mac, Vrfy) be a strong one-time message authentication code and K M be the key space of MAC. We construct a new certificateless encryption scheme CLE from IBE, PKE and MAC, as below:
On input an identity ID and a ciphertext c = (c 2 , σ), the decryptor computes the following:
If b = 0, the decryptor outputs ⊥; otherwise, it outputs m.
Let (ID * , c * ) be the challenge identity-ciphertext pair of the adversary, where c * = (c * 2 , σ * ), and let c * 1 be the plaintext of c * 2 under PKE. Consider a query (ID, c = (c 2 , σ)) submitted by the adversary to the Decryption oracle, and let c 1 be the plaintext of c 2 under PKE. Obviously we have that (ID, c) = (ID * , c * ). We focus on the case in which ID = ID * . Now the event Forge 1 (resp. Forge 2 ) is defined as the event that the key mk extracted from c 2 is the same as that extracted from c * 2 and 1 ← MAC.Vrfy mk (σ) in Game I (resp. Game II). Similar to the proofs of Lemma 1 and 3, we can show that the probability that the event Forge 1 (resp. Forge 2 ) occurs is negligible in k. This is guaranteed by the strong one-time security of MAC. The other parts of the security proof remain the same except some minor modifications. One can easily come up with the security proof of CLE', for its high similarity with CLE.
Remark : As we can see from the above construction, the verification key is removed from the ciphertext and now is hidden in c 2 , and the symmetric signing key is not generated by a (timeconsuming) key generation algorithm any more but randomly selected. Therefore, the scheme CLE enjoys much shorter ciphertext and much higher efficiency than CLE. However, unlike CLE, the main drawback of this new scheme is that the validity of the ciphertext cannot be verified before the decryption any longer. One has to decrypt the ciphertext, even if it is invalid.
Remark Again: To make the new scheme be of practical use, we may use CBC-MAC with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher again. Besides, there are many other good candidates for MAC, such as the strong one-time MACs with information-theoretic security in [14, 15] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the security of certificateless encryption schemes in the presence of a malicious-but-passive KGC, and propose the first generic certificateless encryption scheme in the standard model. The scheme is efficient. We also describe how to apply short signature and hybrid encryption to implement an efficient instantiation of our generic scheme.
On the study of malicious-but-passive KGC attacks, we show that although the scheme in [11] does not have the same key generation procedure as that of [1] , there are two new attacks which can compromise the Type-II security of their scheme. In particular, our second attack allows the KGC to decrypt any ciphertext without pre-selecting a target user.
However, it still remains an open problem on how to construct a certificateless encryption scheme secure with respect to an even stronger security model which combines the strongest one described in [1, 10] and the malicious-but-passive KGC model described in [2] and also in this paper. The model in [1, 10] requires the decryption oracle to provide correct decryption even after the user public key has been replaced.
1. The challenger runs KG(1 k ) to obtain a master public/private key pair (mpk, msk), and sends mpk to A. 2. A can issue two types of queries:
-Extraction: A submits an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , and is returned the corresponding private key sk ID ← Extract(msk, ID). -Decryption: A submits an identity ID and a ciphertext c of its choice, and is returned m ← Dec(sk ID , ID, c). This process can be repeated for polynomially many times. 3. A submits two equal-length messages, (m 0 , m 1 ) along with an identity ID * to the challenger, which then selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at random, computes c * ← Enc(mpk, ID * , m b ), and returns c * to A. 4. A continues to issue queries of its choice as in step 2, for polynomially many times. 5. Finally, A outputs a bit b .
We say A wins the game if b = b, and 1. A didn't issue an Extraction query on input ID * ; 2. A didn't issue a Decryption query on input (ID * , c * ).
We denote by P r[A Succ] the probability that A wins the game, and define A's advantage in the game to be Adv A = P r[A Succ] − 
A.2 Public Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme consists of three (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms, KG, Enc and Dec, which are for key generation, encrypting a message and decrypting a ciphertext, respectively. The standard notion of security of a public key encryption scheme is IND-CCA2, which is defined by the following game between a challenger and a PPT adversary A:
1. The challenger runs KG(1 k ) to obtain a public/private key pair (pk, sk), and sends pk to A.
2.
A requests to decrypt a ciphertext c of its choice, under the public key pk, and is returned m ← Dec(sk, c). This process can be repeated for polynomially many times. 3. A submits two equal-length messages, (m 0 , m 1 ) to the challenger, which then selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at random, computes c * ← Enc(pk, m b ), and returns c * to A. 4. A continues to request to decrypt ciphertexts of its choice. 5. Finally, A outputs a bit b .
We say A wins the game if b = b, and A didn't request to decrypt c * . We denote by P r[A Succ] the probability that A wins the game, and define A's advantage in the game to be Adv A = P r[A Succ] − 
A.3 Strong One-Time Signature
A signature scheme consists of three (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms, KG, Sign and Vrfy, which are for key generation, signing a message, and verifying a signature, respectively. The standard notion of the security of a signature scheme is existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack. A strong one-time signature is a signature scheme with strong existential unforgeability under a chosen one message attack, which is a security notion stronger than the standard one, and defined by the following game between a challenger and a PPT forger F:
y the IND-ID-CCA2 security of IBE, we have that Adv C 1 is negligible. The lemma is proved.
